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Abstract. Sensors inside internet-connected devices analyse the envi-
ronment and monitor possible unwanted behaviour. Current risk anal-
ysis tools, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA), provide prior information on these malfunc-
tions. Many people are involved in this risk analyses process, resulting
in disambiguations and incompleteness. Ontologies could resolve this is-
sue by providing a uniform structure for the failures and their causes.
However, domain experts are not always ontology experts, resulting in
a lot of human effort to keep the ontologies up to date. In this paper,
automated mappings from the FMEA data to a domain-specific ontology
and the generation of rules from a constructed FTA were researched to
annotate and reason on sensor observations semantically. The approach
is demonstrated with a use case to investigate the possible failures and
causes of reduced passenger comfort levels inside a train.
Keywords: Anomaly detection · Root Cause Analysis · Risk Analysis ·
Semantics · Ontology development · Sensor data · IoT
1 Introduction
Sensor monitoring systems are transforming industry, with game-changing ap-
plications in, e.g., transportation [5] and healthcare [17]. These systems can yield
valuable insights into a company's physical assets and the interaction of these
assets with their environment. However, sensors have limited added value with-
out data analysis [19]. More and more, new methodologies are defined to specify
the correct functioning of the system based on these sensor observations. Com-
mon methodologies for observing unwanted system behavior with this data are
Anomaly Detection (AD) and Root Cause Analysis (RCA). AD is the identifi-
cation process of events or observations, which do not adhere to the expected
pattern or other items inside a dataset [17]. RCA guides the problem solver to
deduce and understand the real causes of the anomalies [16]. Interest in AD &
RCA will continue to grow as more relevant data is generated and tools become
widely accessible that can handle data from diverse operating environments.
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Fig. 1: Example of FMEA (a) and FTA (b)
However, domain-specific knowledge needs to be leveraged to clearly define
the unwanted behavior and its causes inside these tools as sensor, or system
behavior in general, varies wildly between application domains. This knowledge
is often provided by domain experts by using risk analysis, which define all
the possible failures and their (observable) effects on the system. Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [2] and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [8] provide
templates to easily provide such analyses. As shown in Figure 1 (a), FMEA
captures, on multiple levels of the system, the potential failures that can occur
to the components and their underlying causes and effects. FTA analyses the
undesired states of a system using Boolean logic. This combination of low-level
events, leading to system failures, can be visualised using a tree, as exemplified
in Figure 1 (b).
Constructing these FMEA and FTA documents is a time-consuming process
when applied thoroughly. A large number of experts are involved, who each have
expertise on other parts of the system and interpret different parts of the risk
analysis differently. Ambiguities, inconsistencies and duplicates are, therefore,
quite common. This reduces the advantages of these risk analysis and makes it
difficult for non-experts to interpret these document. Sharing, however, a com-
mon understanding about the structure of the system and contextual knowledge
amongst the experts could help in separating the domain knowledge from the
operational knowledge about the (mal)functioning of the system. Ontologies and
accompanying inference rules have proven their worth in providing a common
knowledge representation about a domain [20]. However, most system experts
are not familiar with ontology design, which makes these approaches difficult
to implement. Semantic Web experts are required to constantly maintain and
update these ontologies and rules with the domain-specific knowledge.
However, enabling domain experts to generate ontologies and rules based on
the domain knowledge captured in the FMEA and FTA documents will lower
the barrier to use them in existing data analysis methodologies. The generated
ontologies and rules themselves can be used to annotate and reason upon incom-
ing sensor observations, to eventually provide some basic tools for preliminary
semantic-based AD and RCA.
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In this paper, we propose an approach to automatically generate the required
ontologies and inference rules from the aforementioned risk analysis outcomes.
The entries from the FMEA table will be used to create a domain specific on-
tology. The fault trees will be used to derive rules to clarify if a certain sensor
observation leads to a failure or not. The automation of this approach removes
the need for the involvement of ontology and rule experts in the risk analysis
process while enabling maintainable, semantic-based AD and RCA. As such,
the domain experts can focus on their primary task, i.e., applying their domain
knowledge to accurately capture the unwanted behaviour of a system and its
causes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 situates our
approach with respect to the related work. The designed approach is discussed
in detail in Section 3, while Section 4 details the application of the approach on
a real-life use case, i.e., investigating the possible failures and causes of reduced
passenger comfort levels inside a train. Section 5 highlights the most important
accomplishments and discusses the directions for future work.
2 Related work
As previously mentioned, ontology-based risk analysis methods have been pro-
posed. Dittmann et al. [7] describe a process to capture the results of a FMEA
in an ontology, instead of in a document, and highlighted the (dis)advantages.
Rehman et al. [15] and Zhou et al. [21] designed high-level ontologies to model
the main concepts of a FMEA and their relationships. The first applied it to
model the results of a FMEA in the automotive domain. The second used it
to capture the FMEA of wind turbines and developed a reasoning framework
to perform intelligent fault diagnosis using the designed ontology capturing the
domain-specific concepts. Both papers showed how an ontology can be used to
easily trace the relationships between failures and their corresponding causes,
making it easier to interpret the risk analysis. Ontologies to automatically link
the observations made within a particular system to anomalies or faults that
can occur, have also been proposed [13]. Although high-level concepts have been
defined to model irregularities and link them to system components and effects,
an ontology expert is required to model all the domain-specific anomalies that
can occur and how they link to the sensor observations. None of the proposed
ontologies are publicly available, hindering re-use. Moreover, all the approaches
propose to replace the existing methodologies with a process in which the re-
sults of a FMEA are directly captured in an ontology. This requires extensive
knowledge about ontology design from the system experts as the current FMEA
are performed using standard spreadsheet tools.
FTA has the advantage to be a more rigorous approach due to the step-by-
step reasoning. Contrary to FMEA, FTA is a graphical method and already iden-
tifies the interrelations between concepts. As a result, FTA is more interpretable
than FMEA as the latter forces the analyst to decompose the system [14]. In an
effort to automate the construction of the FTA trees, Venceslau et al. [18] de-
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fined an ontology to model the system components and failures and constructed
a technique to automatically generate the FTA tree from the constructed ontol-
ogy. The use of the ontology solves the issue of inconsistencies and ambiguities
between FTA trees due to the lack of a common knowledge representation and
the automatic generation of the tree ensures human understanding of the result.
However, it again requires ontology design knowledge from the system experts.
While an ontology can capture the various concepts occurring within a do-
main and their intricate relationships, additional expressivity is required to de-
rive that a fault has occurred out of the combination of various system observa-
tions. Rule languages, such as RuleML [3] and SWRL [11] can define inference
rules, which are used inside a semantic reasoner to derive logical consequences.
Recently, techniques have been designed to extract SWRL rules from text using
NLP [9] or mine Semantic Web Association Rules from RDF data (SWARM) [1].
However, there are, to our knowledge, currently no techniques which allow the
automated extraction of rules from risk analyses.
It can be concluded that currently no approaches exist that allow system
experts to use their traditional risk analysis methodologies, i.e. FMEA tables and
FTA trees, while still providing methods to automatically extract unambiguous
and consistent ontologies and rules from them in a user-friendly manner.
3 User-friendly approach to extract knowledge from risk
analyses
Both AD and RCA analysing tools require the semantic annotation of the sen-
sor observations to operate. Defining rules which detect the failures based on
the incoming sensor observations, in combination with a domain-specific ontol-
ogy, enables the detection of irregularities and the derivation of their cause. The
generated ontologies and rules are the building blocks to determine unwanted
behavior. They can be incorporated in a knowledge-based monitoring system to
continuously identify anomalies and their causes. For example, they can be in-
tegrated in MASSIF, a data-driven platform for the semantic annotation of and
reasoning on internet-connected data, allowing complex decision-making pro-
cessing [4]. When new sensor observations are generated by the system, MAS-
SIF semantically annotates them using the domain-specific ontologies. MASSIF
then uses a semantic reasoner to process the generated SWRL rules and links
defined in the ontologies to determine whether failures are occurring and what
their possible causes are. As such, the sensed data can be combined on the fly
with background knowledge, resulting in enhanced and adaptive context-aware
AD and RCA applications.
To realize these rules and ontologies in a user-friendly manner, we propose
an approach to automatically extract them from FMEA and FTA documents
and trees, as visualized in Figure 2.
A first part of this automation approach uses declarative mapping rules to
map FMEA documents on domain-specific ontologies describing the components
and their associated anomalies, causes and system effects. Second, predefined







Fig. 2: Overview of the approach to combine knowledge with sensor data for AD
and RCA
translation scripts are used to extract the inferences rules from the FTA trees. It
is important to state that both the mapping rules and scripts are generic and can
be re-used for every new FMEA table and FTA tree. Only when the structure
or template of the documents change, additional mappings or changes to the
scripts will have to be provided. Different methodologies to easily provide these
changes with a minimum amount of human effort or knowledge about ontologies
and inference rules are also provide to perform these changes. Both are part
of the semantic enhancement visualised in Figure 2. A more detailed overview
of the combination of thses two approaches is given in Figure ?? and will be
discussed in the following subsections.
To ease the explanation of the different steps, a running example based on a
smart fire detector will be used in this section. The end goal is to semantically
map the observations from this fire detector to possible failures and give further
tools the possibility to derive possible causes. A part of the FMEA is visualized
in Figure 1 (a) and it describes the possible failures of the available smoke sensor.
A false alarm (failure effect) could be generated when dust accumulates in the
device (failure cause), as it hinders the sensor from observing the environment
correctly.
3.1 Ontology mapping approach
The data inside the FMEA tables can be used to define a domain-specific on-
tology, describing the links between several components of the system and their
possible failures and related causes. The automated process transforming these
tables to an ontology is visualised in the top part of Figure 3. The FMEA tables,
represetned as CSV files, will be used for the mapper as input. The mapper it-
self will use rules to convert the data inside the table to ontology concepts with
predefined links between them. Both the description of the rules and the links
between the concepts in the FMEA tables will be explained in this section.











Fig. 3: Overview of the approach to extract knowledge from risk analyses
Folio ontology
Before we can specificy the methodology to extract knowledge from FMEA &
FTA documents, a definition of the common concepts within the system risk
analysis domain should be given. Therefore, we developed an ontology, called
Folio1, which captures all application-independent concepts that occur within
FMEA, FTA and anomaly detection methods. It is based on the aforementioned
ontologies constructed by Zhou, et al. [21] and Pardo, et al.[13]. There are several
concepts inside the FMEA template similar in the anomaly domain. The effects
and causes of an anomaly can be related to the failure causes and effects, while
both have detection methods and a degree of severity. Combining the concepts
of both of them enables the derivation of the possible anomaly causes with the
available knowledge inside the FMEA worksheets.
The Anomaly class defined inside Figure 4 and the directly connected classes
include all the possible anomaly information. These classes were adapted to
ensure applicability in a context of detecting anomalies for internet-connected
devices and can determine the irregularities in streaming data. The Semantic
Sensor Network (SSN) ontology2 describes sensors and their observations for a
diverse range of devices and is included in this upper ontology. The SSN ar-
chitecture includes a lightweight, but self-contained core ontology called SOSA
(Sensor, Observation, Sample, and Actuator) for its elementary classes and prop-
erties. With their different scope and different degrees of axiomatization, SSN
and SOSA can support a wide range of applications and use cases. By using SSN
& SOSA, the Folio ontology can describe the sensor's observations that are the
1 Folio ontology: https://github.com/IBCNServices/Folio-Ontology/blob/master/Folio.owl
2 SSN ontology: https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-ssn/











































































Fig. 4: The Folio ontology.
basis for analyzing the system behavior. Relationships were defined in Folio to
correlate the SSN classes with possible failures and effects.
The FMEA concepts from Zhou, et al. were extended and related to the
anomaly class inside the Folio ontology. The FailureEffect and FailureCause
classes are subclasses of the anomaly Effect and Cause classes.
Relations between causes and effects are needed to describe the correspond-
ing connections between multiple components. A FailureCause defines a con-
cept with no further hasNextEffect relations. An IntermediateEffect concept
will describe the influence of an intermediate component that is affected by, but
not causing, the detected problem. The whole detection flow can have multi-
ple Intermediate Effects. The LocalEffect refers to the first detected effect
onto the system. A LocalEffect will mostly be related to a faulty sensor ob-
servation itself, describing the current state of the device or system component.
For the fire detector example, the accumulation of the dust will be defined as
a FailureCause. The malfunctioning of the sensors are IntermediateEffects
and they could even have multiple causes. A LocalEffect could be a value too
high observation, indicating something is wrong with the system.
Domain knowledge transformation
The previously described upper ontology Folio can now be used to form a
more domain specific ontology, using the data from the FMEA tables. As such,
anomaly knowledge can be extracted from the FMEA itself, and the causes of
these anomalies can be derived by following the created semantic links. The
mapping approach from these table entries to Folio concepts is visualised in
the top part of Figure 3 and consists of three different steps. First, the tables
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itself must be transformed into a computer-readable format in order to process
the information. Second, rules must be generated to map the column and header
information from the FMEA table to existing concepts inside the upper ontology.
At last a mapping procedure is require to transform all the rows inside the
formatted table to domain specific concepts, eventually creating the domain
specific ontology.
More specfic, FMEA are usually constructed using a spreadsheet program,
transformable to CSV document used for further analysis. The different possi-
ble elements of each record in the FMEA are fixed and defined by the column
headers of the provided FMEA templates. More concrete, every FMEA table
defines minimal the failures, their effects and their causes of a system but varia-
tons are possible and provide addtional information. Consequently, to enable the
mapping of the FMEA on the Folio ontology, these column headers should be
mapped on ontological concepts. To realize this, a mapping language was used,
which enables the declarative definition of how to generate RDF from existing
data sources through a set of rules. This approach is here preferred because
mapping languages provide a reusable solution, while custom software and map-
ping scripts are limited to a specific use case or implementation [6]. Another
advantage is the adaptive character of the mapping rules: when making changes
in the representation of the data (for instance, the risk analysts switch to a
more advanced Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis method), updat-
ing the mapping rules will suffice to incorporate this extra information in the
domain-ontology. Our approach uses the RML mapping language [6].
We defined the RML rules following the guidelines of the Folio ontology
via the RMLEditor [10], which offers a graphical user interface to aid users in
defining rules. The high levels steps we followed are as follows: (i) a sample of
an FMEA table was loaded in the RMLEditor, (ii) the rules were created by an
ontology expert, (iii) the corresponding RDF triples were generated, (iv) if the
triples are not as expected the rules are updated, and (v) the rules are exported3.
Afterwards, the RMLMapper4, a tool to execute RML rules, is used to generate
the ontologies for all FMEA tables. The mappings ensure that for each cell in
the FMEA table, a new class is created in the ontology, which is a subclass of
the class on which the column is mapped according to the rules. For example, if
we consider the 5th cell on the second row of Figure 1 (a), the RMLMapper will
create a new concept DustAccumulation in the ontology, which has as superclass
the FailureCause class.
As such, these mappings can be re-used to translate any FMEA table that is
created according to the standard FMEA structure. Changing the information
inside or adding new information regarding risks and failures to the FMEA doc-
uments do not affect the generation of the domain ontologies at all. Only if the
template changes, e.g. If a new column is added, a new rule must be defined,
which can easily be created by mapping this column to the Folio concept by
using the RMLEditor. Due to the frequently used FMEA templates, this will
3 RML rules: https://github.com/IBCNServices/Folio-Ontology/blob/master/mapping.rml.ttl
4 RMLMapper: https://github.com/RMLio/RML-Mapper
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not happen often. In our fire detector example this means that updating the
FMEA documents, by adding adding an additional cause for the unwanted evac-
uation (for instance a broken test button), does not affect the domain ontology
generation process. The outcome of our mapping approach is a domain ontol-
ogy in OWL,. In our fire detector example this ontology will relate the failures
of the temperature and smoke sensors to the general system effects, using the
relationships of the upper Folio ontology.
3.2 Rule generation approach
While the previous part relates the domain specific information of failures and
causes together, faulty sensor observations must be mapped to the correct fail-
ures before a semantic-based monitoring system, such as the one describe in
Figure 2, can be operational. Rules are helpful in specifying the irregularities in
the data through defining patterns or operational ranges. For example, a smoke
detector can be defined as faulty, when it measures impossibly high values due to
dust accumulation. This requires experts to adequately define the normal value
ranges for these sensors. The Folio ontology and the previously explained FMEA
mapping approach already allow to define the observations and their resulting
values made by sensors. This section describes how rules can be extracted from
the FTA trees to link these observations to possible faults that occur, by using
the process visualized at the bottom of Figure 3. Similar to the FMEA mapping
approach, three different steps can be defined. First, the trees themselves must
be transformed into a computer-readable format in order to process the rules.
Second, tree-agnostic knowledge must mapped to specific rule concepts to per-
form the translation between the tree representations and the rule definitions.
At last a mapping procedure is require to transform all the information inside
the formatted trees to domain specific rules.
Decision Fault Trees
While original fault trees describe the relationship between the components
of the system, they usually do not allow to differentiate the observations from
their possible failures. In the case of the fire detector, the link between the
sensor observations and all the possible failures shows the interaction of the
different system components, but does not capture the difference between the
accumulation of dust or, for example, a broken sensor. A fault tree created
from the FTA restricts the analysis to the relations between the components
inside the system solely. Therefore, a combination of a decision tree, which is
capable of modelling the decision from observations to failure with the possible
consequences, together with the general FTA tree, is used here. This so-called
decision fault tree (DFT) provides tests on the intermediate edges of the tree,
visualising the basic rules for further analysis. Figure ?? gives an example of
such decision tree, related to our fire detector example. When a certain smoke
observation have a value greater than 50 ppm, the observation can be classified
as a ValuesTooHigh failure.







Fig. 5: example of a Decision Fault Tree.
A user interface was designed to built such DFTs, as shown in Figure 8. In
this editor, descriptions of the observation and failure nodes can be given. These
different node concepts should align with the concepts defined in the FMEA.
Tests describing the relations between these observations and failures can be
added or adapted. Several representations are possible for such DFTs. The user
interface outputs JSON file to describe the nodes and the rule-specific edges.
Domain-specific decisions
The constructed DFTs can now be used as input to define the domain specific
decisions, relating the observations to previously defined failures in the FMEA
procedure. To translate the decision inside the tree to Rules, a rule generator
script was designed in Python5 to transform the JSON representation into SWRL
rules. In a first step, the decision and nodes are gathered from the DFT inside a
JSON format. Second, RDF syntax rule definitions are used as mock-ups for the
SWRL rules. These definitions specify all the basic boolean operations, as well
the logical operators (<,≤,==,≥, >). The JSON DFTs are then provided as
input to these definitions, resulting finally in specific SWRL rules. These SWRL
rules can be attached to the FMEA RDF document or can be saved separately. To
give an example, the generated SWRL rule specifying a ValuesTooHigh failure
in the fire detector example of Figure 5 looks as follows:
SmokeObservation(?o) ^ hasResult(?o, ?result) ^
hasValue(?result, ?value) ^ swrlb:greaterThan(?value, 50)
-> ValuesTooHigh(?o)
This rule describes the inference of a ValuesTooHigh failure when an observation
is a SmokeObservation and the result of this observation is greater than 50.
Similar to the FMEA mapping procedure, the python mock-ups are defined
once and are able to operate on all generated DFTs. Changing the information
inside or adding new information regarding risks and failures to the DFTS do
not affect the rule generation process. Only if the DFT components changes, e.g.
If a new functional operators are added, a new mock-up must be defined.
5 Script: https://github.com/IBCNServices/Folio-Ontology/blob/master/swrl_builder.py
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4 Use case: Measuring Train Passenger Comfort
The growing requirements for quality of service put new challenges on the oper-
ation and development of trains and railway tracks. Therefore, research on the
passenger comfort levels has reached high interest in the last decade [12]. As
shown in Figure 6, train bogies are now equipped with accelerometers and gyro-
scope sensors, able to detect the shocks and damping effect of the train on the
tracks. Multiple sensor observations of different train cars can be combined on
a server to indicate the passenger comfort inside the train. Maintenance alerts
are given to both the train or track staff to resolve the issues.
Fig. 6: Schematic overview of a train.
FMEA_temp
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Fig. 7: Train passenger comfort FMEA example
The company installing these train monitoring units, i.e. Televic Rail, per-
formed risk analyses. The resulting FMEA table, visualised in Figure 7, shows
the possible failures of a disallowed comfort level that result in the effect of
multiple falsely generated warnings for the train driver. Two possibilities are
a broken or malfunctioning sensor. The FMEA table shows that the cause of
the latter is varying outdoor temperatures while degradation causes the broken
sensor. Replacing or recalibrating it could solve these issues.
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Fig. 8: Train sensors DFT example
Fig. 9: Ontograf visualisation of the passenger comfort FMEA ontology
A DFT was also modeled by Televic in the designed web interface, as shown
in Figure 8. This tree describes the relationship between the temperature obser-
vations of the accelerometer unit and the humidity observations of the gyroscope
sensor unit with their possible failure modes. A ValuesTooHigh failure can oc-
cur when the temperature of the accelerometer has either a value higher than
125 degrees Celsius. The value range are this high because the accelerometer
module operates on the wheel axles themselves and they are influenced by a lot
of friction. A second failure can be derived when the temperature value is lower
or equal than minus 40 degrees Celsius. At last, the same ValuesTooHigh failure
can be used to indicate the humidity of the gyroscope has a value higher than
85%. All other observations are classified as normal in this simple use case.
The corresponding JSON file of the DFT and the CSV file of the table can be
given as input to the mapping engine. The RML rules are here already predefined
(same rules as defined in the fire detector example) and map the specific input
fields to an RDF train-specific ontology. A schematic overview of the generated
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ontology is given in Figure 9 and visualises the major concepts of Figure 7. The
inferred rules of the DFT, given in Figure 8, are visualised in Listing 1.1. This
listing describes three SWRL rules corresponding with the paths from the sensor
observations to the single failure mode. When an accelerometer temperature
observation reaches the reasoning engine, and its value is greater than to 125
degrees Celsius, the observation will be classified as a ValuesTooHigh failure,
and further actions can be taken.
HumidityObservation (?o) ^
hasResult (?o, ?result) ^
swrlb:greaterThan (?Value , 0.85) ^
hasValue (?result , ?Value)
-> ValuesTooHigh (?o)
hasResult (?o, ?result) ^
swrlb:greaterThan (?Value , 50) ^
hasValue (?result , ?Value) ^
TemperatureObservation (?o) ^
swrlb:greaterThan (?Value , 125)
-> ValuesTooHigh (?o)
swrlb:lessThanOrEqual (?Value , -40) ^
hasResult (?o, ?result) ^
hasValue (?result , ?Value) ^
TemperatureObservation (?o) ^
swrlb:lessThanOrEqual (?Value , 50)
-> ValuesTooHigh (?o)
Listing 1.1: SWRL rules derived from the DFT in Figure 8
5 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, research is proposed to enable the automatic knowledge extraction
out of risk analyses into domain-specific ontologies and accompanying inference
rules. Mappings were provided to incorporate the knowledge inside FMEA doc-
uments into domain-specific ontology. An upper ontology was used to define
relate the main concepts, making the methods operational for several, different
applications. Inference rules were extracted from DFTs, which were able to ex-
press the link between sensor observations and defined failures. Both methods
allow system experts to use the risk analysis methodologies and tools they are
used too to build a domain specific ontology with accompayning rules, without
the additional need for ontology experts. These ontologies and accompanying
rules ensures that a common vocabulary and consistency check is maintained
and can be used to enable on the fly detection of anomalies and their causes
through semantic reasoning. It enables the system experts to focus on the risk
analysis task, instead of on a knowledge modelling task for which they do not
have the adequate ontology design expertise. Future research can now use the
designed ontologies, together with accompanying rules to derive or reason on the
possible causes inferred from the failures. Additionally, the DFT editor itself can
extended with consistency checks to ensure improved rule generation.
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